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MERCEI~- FRASER COMPANY (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION 
and DAWN rriiALIA SODEN, Respondents. 
[Sac. No. 6239. In Bank. Jan. 6, 1953.] 
MERCER- FRASER COMPANY (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION 
and MAUDE MAY EPPING, Respondents. 
[Sac. No. 6240. In Bank. Jan. 6, 1953.] 
MERCER- FRASER COMPANY (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION 
and JOHN F. WALSH, Respondents. 
[Sac. No. 6241. In Bank. Jan. 6, 1953.] 
MERCER- FRASER COMPANY (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION 
and JAMES A. McNABB, Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation- Compensable Injuries- Wilful 
Misconduct.-Lab. Code, § 4553, authorizing awards of in-
creased benefits in industrial accident cases if employes were 
"injured by reason of serious and wilful misconduct" of the 
employer, does not make the employer an insurer of safety 
and does not authorize an additional award on a showing 
of mere negligence, or even of gross negligence. 
[2] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-Under Lab. 
Code, § 4553, awards of increased benefits can be sustained 
only if the employer's misconduct was both serious and wil-
ful, and where the employer is a corporation, such miscon-
[1] Serious and wilful misconduct of employer warranting in-
creased compensation, or action at law, notes, 16 A.L.R. 620; 58 
A.L.R. 1379. See, also, Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 118; 
Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 54. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Workmen's Compensation, § 123; 
[ 5, 6] Workmen's Compensation, § 118; [7] Workmen's Compen-
sation, §151; [8] Negligence, §3; [9-13] Negligence, §8; [14] 
Negligence, §§7, 8; [15,16] Workmen's Compensation, §124; 
[17] Workmen's Compensation, § 180; [18-24] Workmen's Com-
pensation,§ 190; [25] Workmen's Compensation, § 264; [26] Cer-
tiorari, § 62. 
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duct must be "on the part of an executive, managing officer, 
or general superintendent" of such corporation. 
[3] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-Imposition 
of the increased award under Lab. Code, § 4553, on evidence 
showing, or a finding of, conduct any less culpable than that 
specified by the statute would constitute an unlawful taking 
of the property of one person and an unwarranted giving 
of it to another. 
[4] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Wilful Misconduct.-An award 
under Lab. Code, § 4553, although denominated and regarded 
for some purposes as "increased compensation," is actually 
of the nature of a penalty, and cannot be insured against. 
(Ins. Code, § 11661.) 
[5] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Misconduct by Employe.-The 
words "serious and wilful misconduct" as used in Lab. Code, 
§ 4551, authorizing reduction of compensation otherwise re-
coverable where injury is caused by serious and wilful mis-
conduct of the injured employe, must be given the same 
meaning as they have in § 4553, there being no difference in 
principle between the degree of care required of an employer 
and that exacted from an employe in determining whether 
serious and wilful misconduct occurred. 
[6] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Misconduct of Managing Super-
intendent.-In determining whether the managing superin-
tendent of a corporate employer was guilty of serious and 
wilful misconduct which would justify increasing the award 
for other injured employes, a reviewing court must also con-
sider that such misconduct, if the same accident injured the 
superintendent, would require reducing the normal award to 
him. 
[7] Id.- Questions of Law and Fact- Wilful Misconduct.-
Whether in any given case serious and wilful misconduct is 
shown, inherently presents questions of both fact and law; 
insofar as the issues may relate to the credibility of wit-
nesses, the persuasiveness or weight of the evidence and the 
resolving of conflicting inferences, the questions are of fact, 
but as to what minimum factual elements must be proven 
to constitute serious and wilful misconduct, and sufficiency 
of the evidence to that end, the questions are of law. 
[8] Negligence-Definition.-Negligence is an unintentional tort, 
a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation 
that a reasonable man under similar circumstances would 
exercise to protect others from harm. 
[9] Id.-"Wilfulness."-A negligent person has no desire to cause 
the harm that results from his carelessness, as distinguished 
[8] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 4; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 2. 
104 MERCER-FRASER Co. v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. [ 40 C.2d 
from a person guilty of wilful misconduct who intends to 
cause harm, wilfulness and negligence being contradictory 
terms. 
[10] Id.-"Wilfulness" and "Wantonness."-A tort having some 
of the characteristics of both negligence and wilfulness occurs 
when a person, with no intent to eause harm, intentionally 
performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows, 
or should know, that it is highly probable that harm will re-
sult; such a tort is wanton and reckless misconduct, although 
it is sometimes called "wilful negligence," "wanton and wil-
ful negligence," "wanton and wilful misconduct," and even 
"gross negligence." 
[11] Id.-"Wilfulness" and "Wantonness."-Wanton and reckless 
misconduct involves no intention, as does wilful misconduct, 
to do harm, and it differs from negligence in that it does 
involve an intention to perform an act which the actor knows, 
or should know, will very probably cause harm. 
[12] Id.-Wilful Misconduct.-Wilful misconduct necessarily in-
volves deliberate, intentional or wanton conduct in doing or 
omitting to perform acts, with knowledge or appreciation 
of the fact, on the culpable person's part, that danger is 
likely to result therefrom. 
[13] Id.- Wilful Misconduct.- To constitute wilful misconduct 
there must be actual knowledge, or that which is the equiva-
lent of actual knowledge, of the peril to be apprehended 
from the failure to act, coupled with a conscious failure to 
act to the end of averting injury; a mere failure to perform 
a statutory duty is not, alone, wilful misconduct. 
[14] Id.- Gross Negligence: Wilful Misconduct.- Gross negli-
gence is merely such a Jack of care as may be presumed to 
indicate a passive and indifferent attitude toward results, 
while wilful misconduct involves a more positive intent ac-
tually to harm another or to do an act with a positive, active 
and absolute disregard of its consequences. 
[15] Workmen's Compensation- Compensable Injuries- Wilful 
Misconduct.-"Serious and wilful misconduct" cannot be es-
tablished by showing acts any less culpable, any less delib-
erate, or any less knowing or intentional, than is required 
to prove wilful misconduct. 
[16] Id.- Compensable Injuries- Wilful Misconduct. - Serious 
and wilful misconduct is basically the antithesis of negli-
gence, and the two types of behavior are mutually exclusive; 
an act which is merely negligent and consequently devoid of 
either an intention to do harm or of knowledge or apprt>cia-
tion of the fact that danger is likely to result therefrom can-
not at the same time constitute wilful misconduct, and con-
versely an act deliberately done for the express purpose of 
injuring another, or intentionally performed either with know I-
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edge that serious injury is a probable result or with a posi-
tive, active, wanton, reckless and absolute disregard of its 
possibly damaging consequences, cannot properly be classed 
as negligence. 
[17] !d.-Evidence-Wilful Misconduct.-A finding of serious and 
wilful misconduct cannot be sustained on proof of mere negli-
gence of any degree. 
[18a-18c] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-A finding of the 
Industrial Accident Commission that a corporate employer, 
through its general superintendent, knowingly and wilfully 
failed to "furnish employment and a place of employment, 
which was a safe place for the work," and so was guilty of 
serious and wilful misconduct, is insufficient since it does 
not determine that such employer was guilty of more than 
negligence, improperly holds it to the standard of an insurer, 
and, when considered with circumstances indicating that the 
commission was of the view that the superintendent believed 
that the method of construction being employed in the build-
ing in question was sound and sufficient for the safety of all 
concerned, imputes that he was guilty of no more than a 
mistake in judgment. 
[19a-19c] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-Findings of Indus-
trial Accident Commission that a corporate employer, through 
its general superintendent, knowingly and wilfully failed 
properly and adequately to brace and guy the prefabricated 
parts of a building being erected "so as to prevent" the fall 
or collapse thereof during construction, indicate that the 
commission was holding such employer to the standard of 
an insurer or guarantor of the safety of its employes rather 
than applying the legally essential elements to the issue of 
serious and wilful misconduct. 
[20a, 20b] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-Findings of the 
Industrial Accident Commission that a corporate employer, 
through its general superintendent knowingly and wilfully 
failed to "exercise that degree of prudence, foresight and 
caution which, under the circumstances, a prudent employer 
would then and there have" exercised "had it turned its 
mind to the fact" do not establish serious and wilful miscon-
duct, but only negligence. 
[21a, 21b] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-A finding of the 
Industrial Accident Commission that a corporate employer, 
through its general superintendent, knowingly and wilfully 
failed to comply with the requirements of Lab. Code, §§ 6400-
6403, neglecting and omitting to provide necessary and ade-
quate bracing and guying of the prefabricated parts of a 
building under construction "so as to prevent" its fall or 
collapse during construction, is insufficient to show serious 
and wilful misconduct since it presupposes that failure for 
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any reason to install and maintain such guying and bracing 
as would absolutely "prevent" the fall or collapse of the 
structure, would amount to a violation of the listed sections 
and would constitute serious and wilful misconduct. 
[22] Id.-Findings.-The primary rule of construing findings of 
the Industrial Accident Commission is to interpret them lib-
erally in sustaining an award, and even if a finding, by itself, 
is inadequate for uncertainty it will still be upheld if it can 
be made certain by reference to the record. 
[23a, 23b] Id.-Findings.-Although it is not required that find-
ings of the Industrial Accident Commission be specific and de-
tailed, it is essential that they be sufficient in form and sub-
stance so that by reading them and referring to the record 
the parties and a reviewing court can tell with reasonable 
certainty not only the theory on which the commission has 
arrived at its ultimate finding and conclusion, but that the 
commission has found those facts which are essential to sus-
tain its award. 
[24] !d.-Findings-Wilful Misconduct.-Findings of the Indus-
trial Accident Commission which state the ultimate conclusion 
of serious and wilful misconduct of a corporate employer are 
insufficient where they do not specify any facts from which 
a reviewing court can conclude that the basic and essential 
factual elements, which are necessary to support the ulti-
mate conclusion of serious and wilful misconduct, were found 
to exist, and where such findings indicate that the commission 
was holding such employer to the standard of an insurer or 
guarantor of the safety of its employes. 
[25] !d.-Certiorari-Petition-Service.-Where petitions by a 
corporate employer to review awards of the Industrial Ac-
cident Commission for increased benefits under Lab. Code, 
§ 4553, were accompanied by proof of service of copies thereof 
on the commission as required by rule 57 of the Rules on 
Appeal as it read on the date the petitions were filed, failure 
of petitioner to serve copies of the petition on the individual 
respondents either prior to filing such petitions or within 
the 30-day period specified by Lab. Code, § 5950, during 
which the petitions may be filed, does not preclude a con-
sideration of the petitions by the reviewing court in the 
absence of any time limitations set forth in Lab. Code, § 5954, 
requiring that such a petition be served on the commission 
and on every party who entered an appearance in the pro-
ceeding before the commission and whose interest therein is 
adverse to the party filing the petition. 
[26] Certiorari-Petition-Service.-Requirements as to service of 
a petition for certiorari in Code Civ. Proc., § 1107, are more 
directory than mandatory as the court may act on the peti-
tion without any service if it decides to do so. 
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PROCEEDINGS to review orders of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission awarding increased compensation for asserted 
serious and wilful misconduct. Awards annulled. 
Gardiner Johnson, Roy D. Reese and Samuel C. Shenk 
for Petitioner. 
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger, P. H. McCarthy, 
Jr., F. Nason O'Hara, Herbert S. Johnson and Alfred C. 
Skaife for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-In these four consolidated matters peti-
tioner corporation seeks review of awards, made by the In-
dustrial Accident Commission, of increased benefits assessed 
against it under the provisions of section 4553 of the Labor 
Code,1 upon the theory that it was guilty of serious and wilful 
misconduct.2 We have concluded that although we assume 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings which would 
sustain awards upon the issue of serious and wilful mis-
conduct, petitioner is correct in its contention that the findings 
made by the commission do not support the awards, in that 
they disclose that such awards are based upon an erroneous 
aud untenable concept of the law. We conclude further that 
the individual respondents' objections to the jurisdiction of 
this court to entertain these proceedings on their merits can-
not be sustained, and that the awards should be annulled. 
In June, 1948, four employes of petitioner were injured, 
two of them (Soden and Epping) fatally, when the pre-
fabricated parts of a building being constructed by the em-
ployer collapsed and fell while the employes were working 
thereon. The record shows that the commission made a con-
clusional finding that the employer was guilty of serious 
and wilful misconduct and that this conclusion is based on 
various primary findings, including a finding that the em-
ployer's general superintendent knowingly and wilfully failed 
and neglected to properly and adequately brace and guy the 
prefabricated parts of the building being erected, ''so as to 
prevent'' the fall or collapse thereof during the construction. 
The record also discloses, as will subsequently be shown in 
some detail, that the commission was of the view that the peti-
1 Unless otherwise stated, all section citations refer to sections of the 
Labor Code. 
2 A wards for normal compensation were made in other and prior 
proceedings before the commission, and are not here involved or before us. 
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tioner was bound under an absolute duty to preserve the 
safety of the employes, at least to the extent that it was 
humanly possible to foresee and guard against danger, and 
that any failure to maintain such standard of safety, whether 
negligent or otherwise, constituted serious and wilful mis-
conduct. 
Petitioner urges that the awards are unreasonable and 
arbitrary and are not supported by the findings, that the 
findings are not supported by the evidence, and more par-
ticularly that the commission has by the findings and awards 
unlawfully imposed upon petitioner a responsibility to insure 
(i.e., preserve absolutely) the safety of its employes or be 
subject to the increased assessment under section 4553. 
[1] It must be recognized at the outset that the statute 
in question does not make the employer an insurer of safety 
and that it does not authorize the additional award upon a 
showing of mere negligence, or even of gross negligence. 
[2] Under the provisions of section 4553 the awards of in-
creased benefits can be sustained only if the employes were "in-
jured by reason of the serious and wilful misconduct" (italics 
added) of the employer, and where, as here, the employer is 
a corporation, such misconduct must be ''on the part of an 
executive, managing officer, or general superintendent" of 
the employer corporation. (See California Shipbuilding Corp. 
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1947), 31 Cal.2d 278, 279 [188 P.2d 
32].) [3] Imposition. of the increased award upon evi-
dence showing (or a finding of) conduct any less culpable 
than that specified by the statute would constitute an unlaw-
ful taking of the property of one person and an unwarranted 
giving of it to another. [4] An award of the type here 
involved, although denominated and regarded for some pur-
poses as "increased compensation," is actually of the nature 
of a penalty (Campbell, "'Workmen's Compensation," § 423, 
p. 381; cf. E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. 
(1920), 184 Cal. 180, 192 [193 P. 105, 16 A.L.R. 611]), and 
cannot be insured against (Ins. Code, § 116613 ). Such an 
award, therefore, can be sustained only if the evidence estab-
lishes and the commission finds, directly or impliedly, every 
fact essential to its imposition. 
Since in interpreting the law (specifically, the meaning of 
the words "serious and wilful misconduct") we m.ust concern 
3 Insurance Code, § 11661: "An insurer shall not insure against the 
liability of the employer for the additional compensation recoverable for 
serious and wilful misconduct of the employer or his agent.'' 
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ourselves with its impact upon employes as well as upon 
employcrf:l, it should be noted that, with certain statutory ex-
eeptions, the r~egislature has seen fit to penalize employes 
as well as employers for ''serious and wilful misconduct.'' 
''Where the injury is caused by the serious and wilful mis-
c:onduct of the injured employee, the compensation otherwise 
reeoverable therefor shall be reduced one-half . . . " ( § 4551). 
[5] It eannot be seriously disputed that the words "serious 
and wilful misconduct'' must be given the same meaning 
in section 4551 as they have in section 4553. As has been 
heretofore declared, ''There is no difference in principle be-
tween the degree of care required of an employer and that 
exacted from an employee'' in determining whether serious 
and wilful misconduct occurred (see Campbell, "Workmen's 
Compensation," § 393, p. 363; E. Clernens Horst Co. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Corn. (1920), supra, 184 Cal. 180, 188; Park-
h nrst v. Industrial Ace. Co1n. ( 1942), 20 Cal.2d 826, 831 
[ 129 P .2d 113]). In other words, acts of the employer, to 
constitute serious and wilful misconduct which would war-
rant increased compensation must be of no less moment, in 
the relative circumstances, than the acts of an employe which 
would warrant reduction of his normal eompensation. [6] In 
determining, then, whether the managing superintendent of 
petitioner was guilty of serious and wilful misconduct which 
would justify increasing the award for other injured em-
ployes we must also consider that such misconduct, if the 
same accident injured the superintendent, would require 
reducing the normal award to him. 
In order that the general principles of the law, which we 
bereinafter undertake to state with such comprehensiveness 
as appears practicable, may be clearly understood in their 
application to this case, it seems desirable to first relate the 
facts with considerable detail. . 
The prefabricated wooden structure here involved was 
one of three units, A, B, and C, being constructed by peti-
tioner for the Hammond Lumber Company. Hammond sup-
plied the materials and hardware and prefabricated the 
lumber, and petitioner supplied the construction "know-how" 
and the men for the job. Each unit, when completed, was to 
be approximately 500 feet long in a north-south direction and 
192 feet wide. Units A and B, standing side by side, were up 
and all of the bracing, except for the roof panels, was in. 
The accident occurred during the construction of unit C, 
which was situated to the north of, and adjacent to, unit A, 
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and was to be attached to the latter unit (i.e., the south end 
of C was to be attached by trusses to the north end of A) 
to form one continuous building 1,000 feet in length. C was 
not commenced as an extension of A; rather, petitioner be-
gan the erection of C at its most northerly end, raising and 
extending columns and trusses in a southerly direction until 
C reached the junction point with A. 
Each unit was erected with 14-inch square timber columns 
standing vertically on concrete footings. The columns were 
spaced some 60 feet apart along the length of each unit and 
63lj2 feet apart along the width, thus forming rectangular 
areas (termed bays) throughout the unit. Prefabricated 
wooden trusses, 60 feet long (designated as longitudinal or 
wall trusses), were mounted on top of each pair of columns 
along the length of the unit to ·span the space between 
columns, and similar trusses, some 631!2 feet long (designated 
as transverse or roof trusses), were mounted on top of each 
pair of columns across the width of the unit. 
According to the design of unit C, the framework when 
completed would have had longitudinal knee braces con-
necting the several columns with the longitudinal trusses 
each column supported. Also each column would have had 
transverse knee braces and transverse sway braces connect-
ing each column to the transverse trusses which it supported. 
These braces were designed to give the structure support and 
stability against the pressure of external forces. 
The method of erecting the three units appears to have 
been as follows : An initial bay or square (defined by the 
four columns on its four corners) was erected, with each 
of the four columns ''guyed'' to erection towers and also 
" [ G] uy lines [were put] out, ... cross lines .... Inside 
and outside. . . . So it was braced in a square. . . . [I] t 
would be crossed inside, criss-crossed, and also externally 
outside"; longitudinal and transverse trusses were then set 
on top of the columns; the initial bay was made the ''Anchor 
block for the rest of the building blocks [or bays]," which 
were not braced the same as the initial bay; in addition to 
the guying and bracing of the initial bay, guy lines attached 
to "deadmen" (objects serving as anchors buried in the 
ground) were secured to columns along the external sides 
of the structure. 
On the day unit C collapsed all of its columns were up 
except for two bays to be constructed at the northwest cor-
ner, and all trusses were in place except the longitudinal 
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trusses which were to complete the connection between C 
and A. Installation of the bracing required by the plans 
and specifications had been commenced but only one set 
of four sway braces attached to one column and the two 
trusses it supported at the north end of C had been com-
pletely attached. A crew (including the injured employes 
Walsh and Epping) working under foreman Hoffman were 
installing a sway brace at the northern end of C and making 
roof panels, and another crew (including the employes Soden 
and McNabb) under foreman Hatten were installing the 
longitudinal trusses connecting A and C. C collapsed over 
its entire length and width. 
R. B. Mcintosh, superintendent of maintenance and con-
struction and chief engineer for Hammond (the company 
for which petitioner, Mercer-Fraser, was constructing the 
building), testified that he is an engineer by profession ; 
that the plans and specifications for the buildings were drawn 
by an architect and let out for bid by contractors, and that 
petitioner was awarded the contract to build; on the job 
site and on an unspecified date prior to collapse of C, the 
witness, in the presence of Ernest Johnson (construction 
supervisor for Hammond), told McFarlan (petitioner's con-
struction superintendent) that "because of the type of con-
struction I thought the building needed more guy lines at 
that stage of construction. . . . I believe it was in connec-
tion with building 'C,' but the same would apply to all the 
buildings because the type of construction was the same. . . . 
[T] he gist of [McFarlan's reply] ... was that he consid-
ered the building stable enough to stand with the guy lines 
as they were placed .... [H]is statement was to the effect 
that the construction was good heavy construction and that 
he thought it would stay up as it was being done, I don't 
think that he specifically mentioned we had enough guy 
wires, but he figured it was all right the way it was, that was 
the gist of it'' ; ''guy lines in any construction are a form of 
temporary brace to hold the construction in place until the 
braces in the design or whatever might be designed into the 
building to hold it stable are in place''; on the day of the 
accident, just before the building collapsed about 1 p.m., 
there "was a pretty stiff wind, but nothing to evoke any great 
comment as I remember, ... from the northwest"; it is 
"good construction practice to follow along in back of the 
erection of columns and brace them as you're going along . . . 
[including] not only guy lines but sway and transverse 
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braces ... [P] articularly on this building I would say it 
was important ... [T]he particular type of connection of 
the trusses and columns was somewhat unusual"; my "con-
clusion was that ... the collapse of the building was caused 
by . . . a combination of the wind and the inadequacy of 
bracing"; at the time of the hearing at which he was testify-
ing (some two years after the accident) the buildings had been 
completed ''and in the same manner as they were being built, 
except ... there was some additional [steel] bracing added 
to the plans and incorporated in the buildings after the 
[accident] . . . that bracing was in the walls and was not 
included in the work that Mercer-Fraser was to do . . . [and] 
was not planned until after the collapse of the building." 
Ernest Johnson, construction supervisor and ''expediter of 
material'' for Hammond, testified that he is not an engineer 
by profession and had had no prior experience "in heavy 
construction of this particular type . . . before the com-
mencement of" unit A; his job in connection with the con-
struction here involved was to look after Hammond's interests 
and "see that the building was constructed as per drawings 
and specifications"; he had no authority to instruct peti-
tioner's employes ''as to the method they should use to erect'' 
the buildings, ''I could just offer my suggestions'' ; the method 
of construction used was McFarlan's (petitioner's superin-
tendent) ''own idea of how it should be done''; the manner of 
erection and when the bracing was to be installed were left 
to petitioner's discretion and were not shown on the plans 
and specifications. About ''a week or ten days before the 
accident" the witness and his supervisor, Mcintosh, discussed 
the guy lines and the bracing on the three units with Mc-
Farlan; "we figured there should be more guy lines ... Mc-
Farlan ... thought there was enough . . . [W] e didn't 
think there was enough bracing on it, that it may collapse'' ; 
following this discussion nothing was ''done to change the 
guy line situation'' although the witness did not know how 
many guy lines were on unit C on the day it collapsed (after 
the accident he saw some at the north end but recalled none 
in the center of the unit); petitioner's employes started to 
put more guy lines on units A and B "shortly after" C 
collapsed ; the witness recalled no "objectionable features 
concerning the construction" other than the discussion as to 
the guy lines; units A and C were ''almost ·identical'' in con-
struction and plan, the only difference was that C was ''slight-
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ly higher" than A; A and B did not collapse and were still 
standing at the time of the hearing. 
McNabb, one of the injured workmen, who was a carpenter 
and a member of the ''erection crew'' under foreman Hatten, 
testified that on the day of the accident, he and Soden (who 
died from injuries received in the accident) were "working 
on top of" unit C and were engaged in connecting units A 
and C ; no one else was ''on the top'' ; before noon they had 
installed one of the trusses connecting the two units; in so 
doing they had discovered that the gap between A and C 
"was two and a half inches longer than the truss" and "the 
whole building, the 500-foot from the north had to be pulled 
two and a half inches over to connect it"; the two workmen 
"had put a chain block at the top of the truss" on C, and 
"the post at the bottom" of C and "made this two and a half 
inches pull to allow us to get our truss in''; after lunch Mc-
Nabb anti Soden started to install another truss connecting 
the next succeeding columns of A and C, but found the gap 
this time was an inch and a half too short ; again using a chain 
block the two workmen pulled unit C "back an inch and a 
half to allow this truss to go in"; "about five to ten minutes" 
later the building collapsed. McNabb further stated that on 
the evening before the collapse he and Soden had "come down 
off the roof [of C J that evening, and at that particular time, 
there was nothing to hold it except just a box in the air, this 
thing we conld feel it move, and so we . . . told him [fore-
man Hatten] at that time, in fact I told Mr. Hatten the next 
day if something wasn't done I was going to stop, I wasn't 
going- to work, and so he says, 'I think we can make her and 
get her hooked up' "; later the same evening McNabb told 
superintendent McFarlan that "If there ain't something 
done to this building, it won't be here much longer," and 
McFarlan said, "Oh I think it's very good, in very good con-
dition, it's boxed up good and it's wide and the spans are 
long, I think it will stand." 
Harold McFarlan, who had been petitioner's construction 
superintendent for 10 years, was the" general superintendent" 
referred to in the commission's findings as being guilty of 
serions and wilful misconduct. His competence and good 
faith are unquestioned in the record unless we can infer that 
they are negatived by the commission's conclusional finding 
of serious and wilful misconduct. For reasons hereinafter 
developed we think that such an inference is not reasonable 
or tenable and that the commission does not, itself, draw it. 
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Mr. McFarlan testified that he had been doing heavy construc-
tion work for some 40 years; that in this construction of unit 
C the blueprints were followed, as well as good construction 
practice and Safety Orders issued by the State of California; 
that some 10 days before the accident there was a "high 
wind" and "Mr. Mcintosh got worried about the building, 
and so did I, and'' the witness thereupon made ''preparations 
to overcome the deficiency in the bracing'' ; ''we certainly 
didn't knowingly erect anything hazardous, we didn't ask men 
to work in places if we thought it was dangerous, and I cer-
tainly wouldn't ask anybody to work under that building if 
I thought it was going to fall down . . . I certainly wouldn't 
have had my own son and all the other men working under-
neath that building"; on the day before the accident he was 
told by the engineer and the oiler on a crane that some guy 
lines were removed from unit C in order to permit moving 
the crane, and he didn't know whether they were .replaced; 
following the collapse of C additional bracing was installed in 
units A and B; the "internal diagonal 'X' bracing" was not 
placed on unit C ''identical to what it was on buildings'' A 
and B for the reason that Hammond ''requested that we keep 
the passageway open through that building so that the fire-
fighting equipment could get in there in case of a fire,'' but 
other guy lines placed on C were ''adequate to serve the pur-
pose that the internal diagonal 'X' bracing would serve." 
Harold B. Hamill, a consulting structural engineer, testi-
fied that in his opinion unit C collapsed "because it didn't 
have proper . . . braces to resist forces from the west'' and 
that he was referring to any type of brace ''the contractor 
might have wanted to put on which would have resisted forces 
from the west. They could have been guy lines from the out-
side . . . or the inside . . . [ T] here were none. It wouldn't 
have fallen if there had been any.'' 
In support of the award respondents rely upon the familiar 
rules (which petitioner does not challenge) that where the 
evidence is in substantial conflict or is susceptible of con-
flicting inferences the finding of the commission, whether 
for or against the applicant, is final and it is our duty to up-
hold such finding (California Shipbuilding Corp. v. I ndnstrial 
Ace. Corn. (1946), 27 Cal.2d 536, 541-542 [165 P.2d 669]), 
and that questions as to the weight of the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses are for the commission and if 
there is any evidence, whether direct or by reasonable in-
ference, which will support the commission's finding, the re-
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viewing court has no power to disturb it. (Nielsen v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com. (1934), 220 Cal. 118, 122 [29 P.2d 852, 30 
P.2d 995] .) 
Respondents urge that the evidence is susceptible of the 
inference that superintendent Mc]'arlan was guilty of serious 
and wilful misconduct as more particularly specified in the 
findings, hereinafter quoted or epitomized in some detail, 
and in this connection cite various general provisions of the 
Labor Code requiring the employer to maintain safe working 
conditions. (See § § 6310, 6311, 6400-6406.) 4 Petitioner con-
tends that the evidence would support a finding of nothing 
more culpable than a mistake in judgment or, at the most, 
of negligence, by Mc:J:;'arlan on the critical question of ade-
quacy of the guy lines and the bracing in unit C, and that 
by a process of "hindsight" or "reverse reasoning" the com-
mission has imposed upon petitioner the duty to absolutely 
preserve the safety of its employes. The evidence does, of 
course, support the conclusion that the collapse resulted from 
inadequate guying and bracing. To decide intelligently the 
controlling issues in these cases we must first understand 
clearly the essentials for an award. 
[7] Whether in any given case serious and wilful mis-
conduct is shown, inherently presents questions of both fact 
and law. Insofar as the issues may relate to the credibility 
of witnesses, the persuasiveness or weight of the evidence and 
the resolving of conflicting inferences, the questions are of 
fact. But as to what minimum factual elements must be proven 
in order to constitute serious and wilful misconduct, and the 
sufficiency of the evidence to that end, the questions are of 
law. 
The courts of this state have frequently had occasion to dis-
cuss and to define the terms ''negligence,'' ''wilful miscon-
duct,'' and ''serious and wilful misconduct,'' and to emphasize 
the basic and substantial differences between negligence and 
wilful misconduct. For guidance in stating comprehensively 
the elements which must control the Industrial Accident 
Commission and the courts in applying the pertinent statutes 
•section 6310: " 'Safe' and 'safety' as applied to an employment 
or a place of employment mean such freedom from danger to the life 
or safety of employees as the nature of the employment reasonably 
permits.'' 
Section 6311: '' 'Safety device' and 'safeguard' shall be given a broad 
interpretation so as to include any practicable method of mitigating or 
preventing a specific danger.'' 
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to the facts of particular cases we have reviewed the decisions 
in all related types of cases which have come to our attention. 
We bear in mind that the discussions and definitions in the re-
spective cases ordinarily relate primarily to the term or terms 
as used in the particular statute with which the court was 
then concerned and that, for example, it is not necessarily true 
that ''wilful misconduct'' under the automobile guest statute 
(Veh. Code, § 403) has been unvaryingly reg·arded as being 
precisely the same as ''serious and wilful misconduct'' under 
the Labor Code ( § 4553.) But the discussions and definitions 
evolved in cases considering these several statutes and related 
statutes or common law principles are helpful in determining 
what the Legislature must have meant in phrasing the statute 
in question. 
[8] Thus, in Donnelly v. Sonthern Pac. Co. (1941), 18 Cal. 
2d 863 [ 118 P .2d 465], this court in defining what is meant by 
"willful and wanton negligence" as that phrase has been 
used by the federal courts, declared (pp. 869-870): 
"Negligence is an unintentional tort, a failure to exercise 
the degree· of care in a given situation that a reasonable man 
under similar circumstances would exercise to protect others 
from harm. (Rest. Torts, sees. 282, 283, 284; Prosser, Torts, 
sees. 30 et seq.) [9] A negligent person has no desire to cause 
the harm that results from his carelessness, (Rest. Torts, sec. 
282 (c) ) , and he must be distinguished from a person guilty 
of willful misconduct, such as assault and battery, who in-
tends to cause harm. (Prosser, Torts, p. 261.) Willfulness and 
negligence are contradictory terms. . . . [Citations.] If con-
duct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is not 
neglig·ent. It is frequently difficult, however, to characterize 
conduct as willful or negligent. [10] A tort having some of the 
characteristics of both negligence and willfulness occurs when 
a person with no intent to cause harm intentionally performs 
an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows, or 
should know, it is highly probable that harm will result. 
(Rest. Torts, sec. 500 et seq.; Prosser, Torts, pp. 260, 261.) 
Such a tort has been labeled 'willful negligence,' 'wanton and 
willful negligence,' 'wanton and willful misconduct,' and even 
'gross negligence.' It is most accurately designated as wanton 
and reckless misconduct. [11] It involves no intention, as does 
willful misconduct, to do harm, and it differs from negligence 
in that it does involve an intention to perform an act that 
the actor knows, or should know, will very probably cause 
harm. . . . [Citations.] Wanton and reckless misconduct is 
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more closely akin to willful misconduct than to negligence, 
and it has most of the legal consequences of willful miscon-
duct.'' 
[12] And as appears from Porter v. Hofman (1938), 12 
Cal.2d 445, 447-448 [85 P.2d 447] (a case involving the term 
"wilful misconduct" as used in the so-called guest statute, 
Veh. Code, § 403), and cases there cited, this court has ap-
proved the following definitions : ''Wilful misconduct . . . 
necessarily involves deliberate, intentional, or wanton con-
duct in doing or omitting to perform acts, with knowledge or 
appreciation of the fact, on the part of the culpable person, 
that danger is likely to result therefrom." 
"Wilfulness necessarily involves the performance of a de-
liberate or intentional act or omission regardless of the con-
sequences.'' 
[13] " 'Wilful misconduct' means something different from 
and more than negligence, however gross. The term 'serious 
and wilful misconduct' is described . . . as being something 
'much more than mere negligence, or even gross or culpable 
negligence' and as involving 'conduct of a quasi criminal 
nature, the intentional doing of something either with the 
knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury, or with 
a wanton and reckless disregard of its possible consequences' 
. . . The mere failure to perform a statutory duty is not, 
alone, wilful misconduct. It amounts only to simple negli-
gence. To constitute 'wilful misconduct' there must be actual 
knowledge, or that which in the law is esteemed to be the 
equivalent of actual knowledge, of the peril to be appre-
hended from the failure to act, coupled with a conscious 
failure to act to the end of averting injury .... " Substan-
tially the same principles are stated in Helme v. Great West-
ern Milling Co. (1919), 43 Cal.App. 416, 421 [185 P. 510]; 
in James I. Barnes etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1944), 
65 Cal.App.2d 249, 254 [150 P.2d 527] ; in Parsons v. FuUer 
(1937), 8 Cal.2d 463, 468 [66 P.2d 430]; and in Cope v. 
Davison (1947), 30 Cal.2d 193, 198 [180 P.2d 873, 171 
A.L.R. 965]; see, also, North Pac. S. S. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 
Com. (1917), 174 Cal. 500, 502 [163 P. 910]; Ethel D. Co. 
v. I ndnstrial Ace. Corn. ( 1934), 219 Cal. 699, 704 [28 P.2d 
919] ; Hargrave v. Ind11strial Ace. Com. (1940), 5 Cal. Comp. 
Cases 129. 
[14] In Meek V. Fowler (1935), 3 Cal.2d 420, 425-426 r45 
P .2d 194] (a case also involving the so-called guest statute, and 
quoting in part from Howard v. Howard (1933), 132 Cal. 
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.A pp. 124, 128 [22 P .2d 279] [guest statute] ; see, also, Weber 
v. Pinyan ( 1937), 9 Cal.2d 226, 230-235 [70 P .2d 183, 112 
.A.L.R. 407] [guest statute]), the pertinent principles are 
discussed as follows: "While the line between gross negli-
gence and wilful misconduct may not always be easy to 
draw, a distinction appears . . . in that gross negligence 
is merely such a lack of care as may be presumed to indi-
cate a passive and indifferent attitude toward results, while 
wilful misconduct involves a more positive intent actually 
to harm another or to do an act with a positive, active and 
absolute disregard of its consequences. It seems clear that 
in excluding all forms of negligence as a basis for recovery 
in a guest case, the legislature must have intended that to 
permit a recovery in such a case the thing done by a defend-
ant must amount to misconduct as distinguished from negli-
gence and that this misconduct must be wilful. While the 
word 'wilful' implies an intent, the intention referred to 
relates to the misconduct and not merely to the fact that 
some act was intentionally done. In ordinary negligence, 
and presumably more so in gross negligence, the element of 
intent to do the act is present and any negligence might 
be termed misconduct. But wilful misconduct as used in 
this statute means neither the sort of misconduct involved 
in any negligence nor the mere intent to do the act which 
constitutes negligence. Wilful misconduct implies at least 
the intentional doing of something either with a knowledge 
that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from a 
possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act with a 
wanton and reckless disregard of its possible result. 
''Such intent and knowledge of probable injury may not 
be inferred from the facts in every case showing an act or 
omission constituting negligence for, if this were true, any 
set of facts sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence would 
likewise be sufficient to sustain a finding of wilful miscon-
duct. .As has been repeatedly declared, ' "wilful miscon-
duct'' means something more than negligence-more, even, 
than gross negligence.' [Citations.] " [15] Manifestly, "seri-
ous and wilful misconduct'' cannot be established by show-
ing acts any less culpable, any less deliberate, or any less 
knowing or intentional, than is required to prove wilful 
misconduct. 
The situation here, which involved technical matters and 
skilled, expert judgment, is quite obviously distinguishable 
from the cases presented in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial 
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Ace. Com. (1944), 23 Cal.2d 659 [145 P.2d 583), Parkhurst 
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1942), supra, 20 Cal.2d 826, and 
Blue Diamond Plaster Go. v. Indu,strial Ace. Com. (1922), 
188 Cal. 403 [205 P. 678], in each of which it was found 
that the employer had violated an express statute or safety 
order framed to protect the employes. ( Gf. Simmons Go. v. 
Industrial Ace. Com. (1945), 70 Cal.App.2d 664, 670 [161 
P .2d 702].) Thus, in the Bethlehem Steel case, the employer 
violated a specific safety order of the Industrial Accident Com-
mission requiring that loads being transported by trucks 
"shall be secured against displacement" ; in the Parkhurst 
case the violation was of statutes and of specific orders of 
health authorities relating to the purity of, and the methods 
of supplying, drinking water to the employes; and in the 
Blue Diamond case both ''general safety orders of the com-
mission and . . . its express and repeated directions . . . 
with relation to the safeguarding of the belts and pulleys 
of the plant" were violated. By contrast, in the cases now 
before us no such specific statute or safety order is involved, 
but only expert judgment as to the extent of the guying and 
bracing needed in the course of the particular construction 
job here involved. 
Some attempt has been made to isolate statements from 
some of the above cited cases which might appear to sup-
port the view that any negligent act or omission could be 
held to constitute serious and wilful misconduct. By way 
of examples, the following sentences from the indicated cases 
may be quoted: "The long continued maintenance of these 
[dangerous] conditions was properly found to constitute 
serious misconduct" (California Shipbuilding Gorp. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com. (1947), 31 Cal.2d 270, 273 [188 P.2d 27]); 
"It has been held ... that an employer's mistake in judg-
ment does not relieve him from liability for serious and will-
ful misconduct" (Parkhurst v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1942), 
supra, 20 Cal.2d 826, 829-830, 831) ; ''The mere fact the 
employer did not believe the condition was dangerous does 
not relieve him from liability" (Bethlehem Steel Co. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Com. (1944), s~tpra, 23 Cal.2d 659, 665). 
The above quoted statements as used in their contexts and 
applied respectively to the cases there under discussion cor-
rectly enunciate pertinent principles of law or propositions 
of fact. But those statements cannot fairly be isolated and 
understood to support the proposition that conduct which 
both courts and legislative bodies have traditionally defined 
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and considered to be mere negligence, however gross, may 
be held by the Industrial Accident Commission to be serious 
and wilful misconduct under the terms of workmen's com-
pensation statutes. [16] Rather, the true rule i:s that serious 
and wilful misconduct is basically the antithesis of negli-
gence, and that the two types of behavior are mutually ex-
clusive; an act which is merely negligent and consequently 
devoid of either an intention to do harm or of knowledge 
or appreciation of the fact that danger is likely to result 
therefrom cannot at the same time constitute wilful miscon-
duct; conversely an act deliberately done for the express pur-
pose of injuring another, or intentionally performed either 
with knowledge that serious injury is a probable result or 
with a positive, active, wanton, reckless and absolute dis-
regard of its possibly damaging consequences, cannot properly 
be classed as the less culpable conduct which is termed negli-
gence. [17] It follows that a finding of serious and wilful 
misconduct cannot be sustained upon proof of mere negli-
gence of any degree. 
For the purposes of this opinion we assume without hold-
ing that the evidence as a matter of law is not insufficient 
to support a finding that the employers' superintendent, Mc-
Farlan, was guilty of serious and wilful misconduct in de-
liberately, knowingly, and intentionally failing to sufficiently 
brace and guy unit C so that it would not have collapsed 
during the course of construction. As shown above, there 
is testimony that he was warned on at least two or three 
different occasions that in the opinions of others5 the build-
ing needed additional bracing and was unstable and "won't 
be here much longer . . . if something wasn't done'' ; that 
it is good construction practice to brace the columns as they 
are erected, including both permanent bracing (which had 
not yet been installed when C collapsed) and temporary guy-
ing, and that such bracing "particularly on this building 
. . . was important''; that some 10 days prior to the col. 
lapse McFarlan himself became worried and made "prepara-
tions to overcome the deficiency in the bracing'' (the nature 
of such preparations and whether they were actually carried 
to execution, or whether McFarlan deliberately and wan-
tonly refrained from carrying them into execution, does not 
directly appear although the very fact that he was worried 
•we intend no implication as to the weight, if any, which should be 
accorded these opinions, or as to the qualification as experts of the 
persons expressing them. 
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would seem to rather than affirm, either an intent 
to harm or a wanton, positive and absolute disregard of pos-
sible harm) ; that on the day before the collapse McFarlan 
was aware that guy lines had been removed to permit mov-
ing a crane, and he did not know whether they had been 
and that the wind, on the day of the collapse, 
stiff." \Ve particularly assume, for purposes 
but without so holding, that such testimony 
admits of the essential inference (we intend no implication 
that it is to that end or that as triers of fact 
we should so find) that McFarlan was further aware that 
unit C was so unstable as to constitute an imminent and 
probable threat to the safety of the men working on it, and 
that his failure to properly brace and guy the building went 
beyond mere negligence and constituted an intentional omis-
sion of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature done either with 
knowledge that serious or fatal injury was a probable re-
sult or with a positive, actiYe, absolute, reckless and wanton 
disregard for the safety of tl1e workmen. 
An award based on such a finding would be within the 
law. Petitioner wonld not tl1ereby be required to guarantee 
or preRerve ab:;;olntely the safety of its employes, or even 
be free from negligence. as an alternative to suffering the 
additional assessmf'nt provided for by the terms of section 
4553: it would merely have to refrain from such deliberate, 
knowing and intentional failure to take safety precautions, 
whereby its employes were intentionally subjected to known, 
serions. 1mnrces,sary and unreasonable hazards, as the In-
dustrial Accident Commission. we arE' assuming, could have 
inferred as above suggested. But petitioner's contention that 
the commission did not make the subject awards on any such 
view of either the facts or the law and that the findings on 
tl1e issue of serious and wilful misconduct do not in truth 
resolve the crucial issne and, l1ence, are inadequate and fail 
to support the awarils, prrsents a quite differE>nt qnestion. 
In eaeh of these cases the commission's findings on the 
issue of serions and wilful misconduct are that (italics added 
throughout) ''The employee was injured, in said employment, 
by reaRon of the serious and wilful misconduct of the em-
ployer 1·n the nwnner more particularly as follows: ... That 
at, and immediately prior to, the time of injury ... the 
employer through its general superintendent, did knowingly 
and wilfnll~r fail and neglect": 
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[18a] (a) To "furnish employment, and a place of employ-
ment, which was safe for the work ... " (As is shown subse-
quently, it appears that the commission in making this find-
ing was of the view that the mere happening of the acci-
dent, coupled with a mistake in judgment on the part of 
petitioner's superintendent, supports the finding and war-
rants the conclusion of serious and wilful misconduct on 
the part of the superintendent.) 
[19a] (b) To "furnish and use proper, sufficient and ade-
quate safety devices and safeguards; to wit: the necessary and 
required securing, bracing, and guying of the pre-fabricated 
parts of a building, then being erected, so as to prevent the 
fall or collapse thereof during the construction and thereby 
render such employment, and construction, and place of 
employment, and construction, safe for the work ... " (This 
finding seems to impute an absolute duty ''to prevent the 
fall or collapse . . . during the construction,'' and it sug-
gests the view that only by absolute prevention of collapse 
can the employer avoid being held guilty of serious and wil-
ful misconduct for failing to provide a safe place of em-
ployment.) 
(c) To ''adopt and use those practices, means, methods, 
and operations, in securing, bracing and guying the pre-
fabricated parts of a building then being erected, so as to 
prevent the fall or collapse during the construction thereof 
and thereby render such employment, and construction, and 
place of employment, and construction, safe for the work 
" (Again, as in (b), this finding seems to impute an 
absolute duty "to prevent the fall or collapse during the 
construction,'' and a like absolute standard in respect to 
the safety of the work.) 
[20a] (d) To "do those things which a prudent employer 
would have done, had it turned its mind to the fact, and which 
were required to secure, brace, and guy the pre-fabricated 
parts of a building, to protect the life, limb and safety of 
the employees . " (This finding obviously shows the view 
that negligence and serious and wilful misconduct are syn-
onymous.) 
(e) To "use and to exercise that degree of prudence, fore-
sight and caution which, under the circumstances, a pru-
dent employer would then and there have used and exercised, 
had it turned its mind to the fact, in requiring, permitting 
and directing its employee . . . to go, work, and be, in em-
ployment, and construction, and place of employment, and 
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construction, that was then and there unsafe." (This find-
ing like (d), imputes no more than negligence as a basis for 
the conclusion of serious and wilful misconduct.) 
(f) To "use and to exercise that degree of prudence and 
caution which, under the circumstances, a prudent employer 
would then and there have used and exercised, had it turned 
its mind to the fact, in requiring and directing its employees, 
. . . to work upon, or in connection with, the erection of 
prefabricated parts of a building, without first insuring and 
securing proper, adequate, and necessary bracing and guying 
so as to prevent the collapse of said structure during, and 
in the course of, said erection and construction." (This 
finding not only defines negligence to constitute serious and 
wilful misconduct (as do (d) and (e)) but also appears to 
construe as serious and wilful misconduct any failure to 
insure absolute safety of the structure.) 
[21a] (g) To ''comply with the requirements of Labor Code, 
Sections 6400, 6401, 6402, and 6403, and each of them, ne-
glecting, and omitting, to provide, secure, furnish and main-
tain, in place, and at the place of employment, necessary 
and adequate bracing and guying of the pre-fabricated parts 
of a building then being erected so as to prevent its fall or 
collapse during, and in the course of, said construction. " 6 
(This finding seems to presuppose that any failure for any 
reason to install and maintain such guying and bracing as 
would absolutely ''prevent'' the fall or collapse of the struc-
ture, would amount to a violation of the listed sections and 
would constitute serious and wilful misconduct.) 
[22] The primary rule of construing findings is to inter-
pret them liberally in favor of sustaining the award, and 
even if a finding, by itself, is inadequate for uncertainty it 
"In contrast to the commission's findings and conclusions, the report 
of the referee who conducted the hearings is as follows: 
''If anybody would be charged with serious and wilful misconduct, 
it would be on account of Mr. McFarlan's actions in not seeing to it 
that better guy lines or more of them were put up. Having watched him 
carefully at the hearing and considered his testimony in connection with 
the entire record, I do not believe that anybody would question his good 
faith or that he acted with full intentions of looking out for the safety 
of his crew. The fact that he misjudged the stresses and strains on the 
adequacy of the guy lines, if admitted, is not sufficient to charge the em-
ployer with serious and wilful misconduct.'' 
The referee then correctly states the law governing the conclusion 
which should be drawn from the facts as he viewed them and concludes 
with the statement that: ''The evidence is insufficient to establish that 
the injury was caused by the serious and wilful misconduct of the em-
ployer." 
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will still be upheld if it can be made certain by reference 
to the record. This court consistently has been liberal in 
giving effect to such rule (see Vega Aircraft v. Industrial 
Ace. Com. (1946), 27 Cal.2d 529, 535-536 [165 P.2d 665] ; 
California Shipb7tilding Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1947), 
supra, 31 Cal.2d 278, 279; Ethel D. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 
Com. (1934), supra, 219 Cal. 699, 708) and it does not now 
recede from it. But here the problem is not answered by 
that rule. Basic justice and common honesty require that 
the commission and this court be fair to both the employe 
and the employer. The factual elements which, by the stat-
utory requirement, must be found to exist before an award 
for serious and wilful misconduct can be sustained are here-
inabove declared. The critical question here is: On the 
whole record can we fairly hold that the commission has 
found the essential facts to exist? Or, does it appear, rather, 
that to facts not meeting the legal minimums the commis-
sion has applied a standard stricter than that authorized 
by the Legislature? 
After most careful scrutiny of the entire record we con-
clude that the findings here lead to perplexity which cannot 
be cured by reference to the record and that on any reason-
able construction such findings do not fairly support the 
awards. [23a] Although, as indicated above, it is not re-
quired that findings be specific and detailed it is essential 
that they be sufficient in form and substance so that by read-
ing them and referring to the record the parties can tell 
and this court can tell with reasonable certainty not only 
the theory upon which the commission has arrived at its ulti-
mate finding and conclusion but that the commission has 
in truth found those facts which as a matter of law are 
essential to sustain its award. 
[20b] It is obvious, as indicated above, that certain of 
the specifications of ''fact'' contained in the findings are 
wholly insufficient, in that they include matters which on 
any view whatsoever are significant of nothing more culpable 
than negligence, as for example, in paragraph (e) of the 
quoted findings (see, also, paragraphs (f) and (d)), that 
the employer, through its general superintendent, failed and 
neglected to ''exercise that degree of prudence, foresight 
and caution which, under the circumstances, a prudent em-
ployer would then and there have'' exercised, and so was 
guilty of serious and wilful misconduct. Such statements 
concerning what a "prudent employer" would have done 
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''had it turned its mind to the fact'' obviously do not estab-
lish serious and wilful misconduct, which, as has been shown, 
requires an act or omission to which the employer has ''turned 
its mind.'' as also above suggested, such statements 
indicate that the commission has held acts and omissions 
to no more than negligence, to constitute serious 
and vvilful misconduct. Yet, as previously shown, negligence 
and wilful misconduct are inherently incompatible. The 
quoted of fact, disregarding the ultimate conclu-
sion of serious and wilful misconduct, do not in any re-
spect determine that the employer here, through its general 
superintendent, was guiJty of more than negligence. Such 
findings do not with any reasonable certainty determine 
any facts from which this court can conclude that the peti-
tioner was guilty of serious and wilful misconduct or that, 
in truth, the commission itself has found facts which warrant 
such ulitimate conclusion. 
'fhc made do not determine that the general 
superintC'ndent had knowledge that if be failed to add 
further guying and bracing a probable result would be the 
collapse of the building, nor can this court determine that 
the commission found as a fact that such superintendent did 
in truth know' or believe that the guying and bracing was 
insufficient and that a possible result would be the collapse 
and the serious injury of employes and with that knowledge 
proceeded with reckless, absolute, positive and wanton dis-
regard of thr consequenrefl. Rather, the commission's findings, 
in ((!), (e), and (f), on the issne of serious and 
wilfnl mif'condnct demonstrate that the commission has re-
garded as snch seri01lS and wilful misconduct acts and omis-
sions 'ivhieh as a matter of law do not com;titute such miscon-
(hwt. lmt merely evidence neglig·ence, [18b, 19b, 21b] and 
as to ), (b) (c), and (g) it appears that the com-
mission has gone even farther than to hold that negligence is 
serions and wilful misconduct; it seems to have held peti-
tionrr to the standard of an insurer. 
can be said that the findings, or any of 
and that thrir langmtge might admit 
which wonld snstain the awards npon 
stanflards which we havr enmH~iated, we are satisfied 
thr rreon1 here precludes intrrpretation to that end. 
cannot here fairly be resolved in favor 
the awards because reference to the record and 
to the commission's formally declared position (its own Ian-
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guage is hereinafter quoted) seems to demonstrate that the 
commisson did not in truth find, and does not believe, that 
all the essentials of wilful and serious misconduct have been 
proven. 
[24] The commission argues that the findings establish 
serious and wilful misconduct since they state the ultimate 
conclusion of such misconduct. However, such findings do not 
specify any facts from which this court can conclude that 
the basic and essential factual elements, which it is herein-
before shown are necessary to support the ultimate conclusion 
of serious and wilful misconduct, were found to exist. Instead, 
such findings indicate that, as urged by petitioner, the com-
mission was holding petitioner to the standard of an insurer 
or guarantor of the safety of its employes, rather than apply-
ing to the issue of serious and wilful misconduct the legally 
essential elements which we have specified in detail herein-
above. [19c] Thus, in the quoted paragraphs (as more 
specifically identified above), the words employed by the 
commission indicate the view that petitioner had an absolute, 
or substantially an absolute, duty and responsibility to make 
and keep the employment conditions safe against all hazards 
and to absolutely prevent (at least, as hereinafter noted from 
the argument of the commission, "In the absence of circum-
stances which could not be foreseen,'' as, for example, an act 
of God) the collapse of the building here involved, and that 
any failure to meet that standard, whether due to negligence 
or otherwise, constituted serious and wilful misconduct. 
Furthermore, the argument made by the commission itself 
in its answers to the petitions for the writ conclusively estab-
lishes that in fairness to the petitioner this court cannot in-
terpret the conclusional findings as being an actual determina-
tion of the essential facts. For example, it is declared in such 
answers that ''An employer's failure to comply with the re-
quirements of Labor Code, Sections 6400 through 6403 [deal-
ing with an employer's duty to maintain safe working con-
ditions], constitutes serious and wilful misconduct . . . In 
the absence of extraordinary circumstances which could not 
[apparently meaning in the exercise of the highest degree of 
care and capability] be foreseen, petitioner was under a duty 
to employ methods and practices in the erection of the build-
ing to 1"nsure that it would not collapse from the pressure of 
forces to which it might be subjected during the construction 
period. Petitioner's failure to take adeqtwte precautions 
against the dangers inherent in the erection of the structure 
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clearly constitutes seriotts and wilful misconduct ... McFar-
lan 's failure to provide additional bracing was predicated 
on his belief that his method of construction and the guying 
provided was adequate to sustain the structure." (Italics 
added.) 
[18c] It is manifest from what has been said that if Mc-
Farlan in good faith believed (and the commission says he did 
believe) that the method of construction being employed was 
sound anfl sufficient for the safety of all concerned then he 
was guilty of no more than a mistake in judgment. His mis-
take in judgment on a technical matter of construction prac-
tice is his only "misconduct." In the light of these circum-
stances and the commission's statement, it seems unthinkable 
that the commission actually intended to hold, or has held, 
that McFarlan was guilty of serious and wilful misconduct 
within the true meaning of that term as defined hereinabove; 
a meaning, as already pointed out, which would require that 
if he had been injured in the building collapse, the normal 
award to him would have to be reduced. There is no sugges-
tion that McFarlan was incompetent or inexperienced or that 
his employer (the petitioner) was itself guilty of misconduct 
in employing McFarlan for the job at hand. Under the cir-
cumstances here appearing, annulment of the awards is com-
pelled. 
[25] .As previously indicated, in each of the four cases 
the individual respondent has filed a "Special .Appearance in 
Answer to'' the petition for the writ and for hearing in this 
court, in which it is urged that the court is without juris-
diction to consider such petition by reason of the failure of 
the petitioner to serve a copy of the petition :for the writ upon 
the individual respondent either prior to filing such petition 
or within the 30-day period specified by section 59507 during 
which the petition may be filed. On the date (.April 13, 1951) 
of filing of the petitions for review the Rules on .Appeal pro-
vided, in rule 57, that "(a) .A petition to review an order or 
award of the Industrial .Accident Commission shall be ac-
companied by proof of service of 2 copies thereof on the In-
7 Section 5950, at the times here involved, provided: "Within thirty 
days after the petition for a rehearing is denied, or, if the petition is 
granted, within thirty days after the rendition of the decision on the 
rehearing, any person affected thereby may apply to the supreme court 
or to the district court of appeal of the appellate district in which he 
resides, for a writ of review, for the purpose of inquiring into and 
determining the lawfulness of the original order, decision, or award, 
or of the order, decision, or award on rehearing.'' 
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dustrial Accident Commission ... , '' and petitioner complied 
with this rule. A copy of the petition was not, however, 
served upon the individual respondents or their attorneys 
until July 20, 1951, and the respondents contend that this 
failure to comply earlier with the provisions of section 59548 
precludes our consideration of the petition. 
Counsel for petitioner state that the delay in serving re-
spondents' attorneys resulted from their complete reliance 
upon the Rules on Appeal, and that they inadvertently over-
looked the service provisions of section 5954 until after the 
filing of the "Special Appearance" of each individual re-
spondent. 9 vV e are not disposed, however, to accept the view 
that such service provisions can properly be interpreted as 
excluding jurisdiction under the circumstances shown here. 
It is to be noted that no time limitations appear in section 
5954. In section 5905 the Legislature has directed that a copy 
of a petition to the commission for reconsideration ("rehear-
ing" prior to 1951 amendment) of an award be served "forth-
with" (apparently after filing, see §§ 5903, 5904) upon all 
adverse parties, and if a definite time limit was intended to 
apply to service of a copy of a petition for a writ of review 
it could easily have been included in section 5954. 
Respondents rely upon statements that ''The right to be 
present at any hearing necessarily includes the right to have 
notice of such hearing in time to attend" ( Car·stens v. Pills-
bury ( 1916), 172 Cal. 572, 577 [ 158 P. 218] ) , and that "'l'he 
real adverse party in interest [in a certiorari proceeding] 
... is the one in whose favor the act complained of has been 
done" (Lee v. Small Claims CmiTt (1939), 34 Cal.App.2d 1, 
5 [92 P.2d 937]), and also upon the holding in Lyydikainen 
v. Industr-ial Ace. Com. (1939), 36 Cal.App.2d 298 [97 P.2d 
993], annulling an order of the commission where failure to 
8Section 5954 provides: ''The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 
relating to writs of review shall, so far as applicable, apply to proceed-
ings in the courts under the provisions of this article [the article con-
cerning judicial review of commission awards]. A copy of every plead-
ing filed pursuant to the terms of this article shall be served on the 
commission and upon every party who entered an appearance in the 
action before the Industrial Accident Commission and whose interest 
therein is adverse to the party filing such pleading.'' 
"Rule 57, Rules on Appeal (as amended effective November 13, 1951) 
now provides ''(a) A petition to review an order or award of the In-
dustrial Accident Commission shall be accompanied by proof of service 
of 2 copies thereof on the Industrial Accident Commission and one copy 
upon each party who entered an appearance in the action before the In-
dustrial Accident Commission and whose interest therein is adverse to 
the party filing the petition. . . . ' ' 
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(•.omply with statntory provision:,; for service of a petition for 
an order termillating liability resulted in an award terminat-
emnpem;ation payments to an injured employe without an 
opportunity tn the employe to be heard. In the present 
cases, however, the individual respondents have not been 
denied notice or opportunity to be heard and to file answers 
to the petitions for writs of review; on the contrary they 
admit being served on June 16, 1951, with copies of the 
amrwers (on the merits) filed by the commission to the peti-
tions for the writ and on July 20, 1951, with copies of the 
petitions for the ·writ. [26] Moreover, as observed by the 
(:ourt in Pete1· v. Board of SuperV?:sors (1947), 78 Cal.App. 
2d 515, 521 [178 P.2d 73], '"l'he requirements as to service 
when the petition [for the issuance of any prerogative writ, 
including certiorari] is filed, in section 1107 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, wonld seem to be more directory than manda-
tory as the c:ourt may act on the petition without any ser-
vice if it decides to do so. Under these circumstances it would 
seem that service might be made after the petition is filed 
if the court should decline to proceed in the matter without 
service. 'fhe proYisions as to service and points and authori-
ties in opposition to the issuance of a writ under the prayer 
of a petition would seem to be more for the benefit of the court 
than for the advantage of the parties.'' (See, also, Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1069.) We believe the same observation is appropriate 
with reference to the serviee provisions of section 0954 of the 
Labor Code, and hold respondents' contentions on this point 
to be without merit. 
For the reasons above stated, the subjeet awards are 
auunlled. 
Uibson, C. ,J., Edmonds, J., 'rraynor, J., Spence, J., and 
IV ood (Parker), ,J. pro tern., concurred. 
CAH'l'EH, J.-I dissent. 'rbe majority opinion in this case 
is a definite departure from what has been considered the 
settled law of this state in industrial accident cases, namely, 
that where specific findings of fact are snpported by sub-
stantial evidence, an award based thereon will be affirmed. 
Here the commission found, on evidence assumed by the ma-
jority to be sufficient to support such findings, that petitioner 
h:novvingly and wilfully failed: 
(a) 'l'o furnish employment, and a place of employment, 
which was safe for the work. 
40 C.2d--5 
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(b) To fnruish and usc proper, sufficient and adequate 
safety devices and safeguards; to wit: the necessary and re-
tjuired seen ring, bracing, and guying of the prefabricated 
parts of a building, then being erected, so as to prevent the 
fall or collapse thereof during the construction and thereby 
render such employment, and construction, and place of em-
ployment safe for the work. 
(c) 'l'o adopt and use those practices, means, methods, and 
operations, in seeuring, bracing and guying the prefabricated 
parts of a building then being erected, so as to prevent the 
fall or collapse during the construdion thereof and thereby 
render such employment, and construction, and place of em-
ployment safe for the work. 
( cl) To do those things which a prudent employer would 
haYe done, had it turned its mind to the fact, and which 
were required to secure, brace, and guy the prefabricated 
parts of a bnilding, to protect the life, limb and safety of the 
employees. 
(e) To use and to exercise that degree of prudence, fore-
sight and caution which, under the circumstances, a prudent 
employer ·would then and there have used and exercised, had 
.it turned its mind to the fact, in requiring, permitting and 
directing its employees to go, work, and be, in employment, 
and construction, and place of employment, that was then 
and there unsafe. 
(f) To use and to exercise that degree of prudence and 
eaution which, under the circumstances, a prudent employer 
would then and there have used and exercised, had it turned 
its mind to the faet, in requiring and directing its employees, 
to work npon, or in connection with, the erection of prefabri-
cated parts of a building, without first insuring and securing 
proper, adequate, and necessary bracing and guying so as 
to prevent the collapse of said structure during, and in the 
co1Jrse of, said erection and construction. 
(g) 'fo comply with the requirements of Labor Code, sec-
tions 6400, 6401, 6402, and 6403, and each of them, neglecting, 
and omitting, to provide, secure, furnish and maintain, in 
place, and at the place of employment, necessary and ade-
quate bracing and guying of the prefabricated parts of a 
building then being erected so as to prevent its fall or collapse 
during, and in the course of, said construction. 
1'he majority assumes that the evidence is sufficient to • 
support such findings, but nevertheless annuls the award be-
eause it interprets these findings as supporting a conclusion 
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that petitioner was guilty of negligence only. By what legerde-
main may it be said that an employer who is found guilty 6f 
serious and wilful misconduct because he knowingly and wil-
fully failed to provide a safe place for his employees to work, 
is guilty of negligence only? The answer to this question 
contained in the majority opinion is based upon a process of 
reasoning out of barmony with the social philosophy which 
postulated the statutory provisions here involved and renders 
them ineffective. This philosophy stems from the basic eon-
cept that industry should bear the burden of injuries suffered 
hy working men and women in the course of their employ-
ment, and since the employer could insure against injuries 
resulting from negligence it was necessary, in order to force 
employers to comply with safety regulations and provide safe 
places of employment, that they be subjected to increased 
awards to thoRe injured as the result of their wilful failure 
to so comply. This philosophy is embodied in our statutes, 
and cases arising thereunder ·which have come to this court 
for review indieate judicious consideration by the Industrial 
,\cci<1ent Commission. The ease at bar is no exception. 
Brushing aside the sophistry with which the majority 
opinion is repletr, what are the realities of the situation here 
presented'! They clearly show the evidence was suffieient. 
A building collapsed in the course of construction and four 
nwn working thereon were seriously injured-two of them 
fatally. It is admitted that the cause of the eollapse was 
iusnfficient bracing-that this condition was called to the 
attention of the: employer's superintendent and he did nothing 
to correct it although he had ample time and the means to 
do so. In otber words the building was unsafe because it 
was not sufficiently braced and the employer knew that it wafl 
therefore highly dangerous-a danger that would inevitably 
result in serim1s injuries and death. Yet with that lmowledge 
he put the workmen on the job. Certainly if an employer 
knows a place of work is fraught with grave danger but still 
ecnnpelr-; his employees to face that danger, he evinces a reek-
le!'>s disregard of the safety of his employees. \Vhateyer may 
have lwen the motives for his eonduet, to save money, or 
time or to c;atisfy a sadistic impulse is not important. The 
wenk ex(~l!Se of thr• superintem1ent that he thought the build-
ing lmd (~fHJttg·h bra('ing eannot r'hange the result. 'l'he com-
mission could diRbelievr' his testimony as to what he thought 
and conclude that, he had full knowledge that the building 
was in an nnsafe eondition. On this evidfmce, the commi.s-
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sion found that the employer knowingly and wilfully failed 
to provide a safe place of employment for the men who were 
injured and that such failure constituted serious and wilful 
mi:sconduct. I do not see how the commission could have 
found otherwise. But the majority of the court seems to 
be more concerned with technical terms and phraseology than 
the liberal application of the law enacted for the protection 
of working men and women who have suffered loss of life 
and serious injuries as the result of its violation. In fact, 
the whole tenor of the majority opinion is to emphasize the 
burden placed on the employer by this legislation and mini-
mize its salutary objective. It is the age-old reactionary con-
cept of property rights above human welfare: 'What does it 
matter that working men and women are killed and injured 
because industrial enterprises are unsafe so long as em-
ployers can escape liability? To guard against injury to em-
ployees may cost the employer money, so why should he do 
so without compulsion? The answer is that experience has 
shown that some employers will not provide safety devices 
unless forced to do so, hence the remedial legislation here in-
volved-that life and limb of employees be protected against 
unnecessary risks even if it costs the employer money to do 
so. Not only has the Legislature spoken by creating the lia-
bility of increased awards where serious and wilful mis-
eonduet is involved, but it has declared it to be the duty of 
the e<1nrts to liberally construe the provisions of the act "with 
the purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of 
persons ·inj1.wecl in the course of their employment.'' (Em-
phasis added.) (Lab. Code, § 3202.) This legislation has been 
generally accepted as extending to working men and women 
a measure of the economic and social justice to which people 
in industrial employment are entitled. Thinking people 
agree that social progress means, generally speaking, the 
gradual advaneement of human welfare toward greater 
physic:1l. moral and eultural enjoyment of life. The legis-
lation here involved tends toward this objective and should 
he liberally construed to achieve it. The present decision 
finds no parallel in the annals of the judicial history of this 
state in its antithesis of liberal construction with respect to 
both the act here involved and the proceedings before the 
Industrial Accident Commission and this court. 
The majority opinion assumes that there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of serious and wilful misconduct 
on the part of the employer and therefo~e increased benefits 
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eonld be properly awarded against it under section 4553 of 
1 he !Jaboe but it annuls the award on the grounds that 
the findings are uot ~'>ufficient to support the award; that they 
are based upon the tl1eory that negligence constitutes wilful 
misconduct and that all that was found was negligence. 
'l'he rnain contention made by the petitioner here is that 
t hP evidence is insufficient to support a finding of serious 
aml wilful misconduct, yet the ma;jority refuses to pass upon 
that question. (lt is a matter r will discuss later herein.) 
'l'hat refusal violates the policy expressed by statutes dealing 
with decisions on appeal that where a new trial is granted 
the court shall ''pass upon and determine all questions of law 
involved in the case, presented upon such appeal, and neces-
sary to the final determination of the case.'' (Code Civ. 
Proe., §53.) It is especially pertinent here for when the 
•·ase goes back to the commission all it needs to do is to amend 
its findings. Petitioner will again seek a review of the case 
mging its main point that the evidence is insufficient. If the 
court decides it is insufficient then the case can be retried 
with additional evidence and another review sought. Such 
<lelays are inexcusable and should not be countenanced. 
The findings are clearly sufficient. 'l'hey read that the 
employee was injured by reason of the "serious and wilful 
misconduct" of the employer "in the manner and more par-
ticularly as follows.'' Then follow various particular find-
ings. \Ve need go no further under the law than the find-
ings of serious and wilful misconduct ; the particular findings 
may be ignored. A finding of serious and wilful miscon-
duct in those words-the words of the statute (Lab. Code, 
§ 4553)-is sufficient. (California Shipbuilding Corp. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Corn., 31 Cal.2d 270 [188 P.2d 27) ; Kaiser 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 81 Cal.App.2d 818 [185 P.2d 
353] ; General Petroleum Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 90 
Cal.App. 101 [265 P. 508] ; Clarke v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 
87 Cal.App. 766 [262 P. 471]; Dawson v. Industrial Ace. 
Corn., 54 Cal.App.2d 594 [129 P.2d 479]; Vega Aircraft 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 27 Cal.2d 529 [165 P.2d 665] ; 
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 29 Cal. 
2d 492 [175 P.2d 823]; Ethel D. Co. v. Indust1·ial Ace. Com., 
219 Cal. 699 [ 28 P .2d 919].) It is equally clear that a 
court will not annul an award if the findings are inconsistent. 
Tf there are findings which will sustain the award other find-
ings which would annul it are not available for that pur-
pose. (George L. Eastman Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 186 
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Cal. 587 [200 P. 17] ; 8m~thern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 
Corn., 177 Cal. 37R r110 P. i\22]; Coombs v. Industrial Ace. 
Com._, 76 C<1l.A pp. 565 i 245 P. 445] ; Hines v. Industrial Ace. 
Corn., 215 Cal. 177 [8 P.2d 1021] .) It necessarily follows 
that the majority holding which annuls the award by rely-
ing upon findings other than the ultimate one of serious 
and wilful misconduct is squarely contrary to the foregoing 
authorities. Yet none of them is even discussed. If it is 
the intention of the majority to overrule those cases it should 
be done openly and frankly. Moreover the statutory re-
quired liberal construction of the workmen's compensation 
laws (Lab. Code, § 3202) demands that the findings be lib-
erally construed to support the award. 
T n addition to the finding·s of the ultimate fact of wilful 
misconduct, the commission expressly found the existence 
of wilful misconduct in detail. After making the ultimate 
finding, it is said that the misconduct occurred particularly 
as follows: That at and prior to the time of the collapse 
the employer "did knowingly and wilfully fail"; then fol-
low seven separate paragraphs (a to g) specifying what the 
employer wilfully and knowingly failed to do or did, such 
as to furnish a safe place for the employee to work, to fur-
nish and use proper safety devices, namely, bracing and 
guying for the structure so as to prevent its collapse. That 
such findings are adequate is beyond doubt. If an employer 
knowingly and wilfnlly fails to furnish a safe place for the 
employee to work (a safe place of employment is required 
by the safety laws of this state*) or to furnish supports to 
prevent a certain building from collapsing and injuring 
and killing workmen, we have the clearest case of Rerious 
and wilful misconduct that could be imagined. 
The majority opinion cannot be reconciled with numerous 
eaRes. In Parkhurst v. Indttstrial Ace. Corn., 20 Cal.2d 826 
f12!) P.2d 1131, this court annulled a commisRion finding 
of no wilful misconduct stating: "It has been held repeatedly 
*''Every employer shall furnish employment and n place of employ-
ment which are s3fe for the employees therein.'' (Lab. Code, ~ 6400.) 
''Every employer shall furnish and use safety deviees and safeg-uards, 
and shall adopt and use practices, means, methods, operations, and proc-
esses, which are reasonably adequate to render such employment and 
plac-e of employment safe. Every employer shall do every other thing 
reasonably necessary to protect the life and safety of employees.'' (Lab. 
Code, § 6401.) " 'Safe' and 'safety' as applied to an employment or a 
place of employment mean such freedom from danger to the life or 
safety of employees as the nature of the employment reasonably 
permits." (Lab. Code, ~ 6310.) 
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that the employment of workmen under dangerous condi-
tions that can be guarded against constitutes a reckless dis-
regard for their safety. (Emphasis added.) (Hatheway 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, [13 Cal.2d 377 (90 P.2d 68)]; 
Hoffman v. Department of Indus. Relations, supra, [209 Cal. 
383 (287 P. 974, 68 A.L.R. 294)] ; Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., sttpra, [209 Cal. 412 (288 P. 66)] ; 
Gordon v. Industrial Ace. Corn., supra; Blue Diamond Plas-
ter Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, [188 Cal. 403 (205 P. 
678)] ; Johannsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 113 Cal.App. 162 
[298 P. 99] .) " In Hatheway v. Inclustrial Ace. Com., 18 
Cal.2d 377, 380 [ 90 P .2d 68], the principles are stated and 
eases discussed : ''It has frequently been said that wilful 
misconduct involves the knowledge of the person that the 
thing whieh he is doing is wrong .... Conceding that knowl-
edge is required, it seems to us that in order to prove the 
requisite knowledge, it is not necessary for the evidence to 
show positively that the person was notified of the unsafe 
condition of his premises, but that it is sufficient if it ap-
pears that the circumstances surrounding the act of com-
mission or omission are such as 'evince a reckless disre-
gard for the safety of others and a willingness to inflict 
the injury complained of.' " 
''The cases are quite uniform to the effect that permit-
ting employees to work under dangerous conditions which 
are capable of being guarded against, constitutes such a 
reckless disregard for the safety of the employees that the 
Commission's finding that such conduct is serious and wilful 
will not be disturbed. The mere fact the employer did not 
believe the condition was dangerous does not relieve him 
from liability. 'l'hus in Blue Diamond Plaster Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 188 Cal. 403, 409 [205 P. 678], the em-
ployee was killed as a result of the failure of the employer 
to place guards on machinery. The managing agents of 
the employer testified that they knew of the condition, but 
stated that they did not consider the condition unsafe. 'Their 
mistake in judgment upon that subject cannot be held to 
relieve their employer from liability.' An award based on 
serious and wilful misconduct was affirmed. In Hoffman 
v. Department of Industrial Relations, 209 Cal. 383 [287 
P. 974, 68 A.L.R. 294], it was held that where the employer 
violated the terms of a statute providing· for a specified type 
of temporary flooring and its method of construction to 
be used when erecting a building, he was guilty of serious 
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and wilful misconduct, even though the employer was ig-
norant of the provisions of the statute. In Pa,e;ific Emp. 
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 209 Cal. 412 [288 P. 66], 
the employee was injured by an unguarded saw. The em-
ployer was held guilty of serious and wilful misconduct al-
though the saw had been in operation but a week, and the 
employer testified that he intended to place a guard thereon. 
In Gordon v. Industrial Ace. Com., 199 Cal. 420 [249 P. 
849, 58 A.L.R. 1374], the employee was killed in a cave-in 
of a gravel pit. It was held that compelling an employee 
to work in a dangerous spot, without taking protective 
measures, where the employer knows or should have known 
of the danger is serious and wilful misconduct. In holding 
an employer guilty of serious and wilful misconduct under 
somewhat similar circumstances the appellate court in Johann-
sen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 113 Cal.App. 162, 166 [298 P. 
99], stated: 'Had he (the employer) turned his mind to a 
consideration of the subject he must have known that a 
person working in the trench was in jeopardy, which dan-
ger could readily have been obviated by the necessary brac-
ing.''' 
While the above cited cases differ factually from the case 
at bar the philosophy and legal concept of those cases is 
equally applicable here. The dangerous character of the 
place where the employees were required to work was ob-
vious, If it was not known it was of such a character that 
it should have been known. Steps could easily have been 
taken to alleviate the danger but the employer did nothing 
whatsoever and sent the employees on that dangerous mis-
sion with reckless disregard of their safety. 
To evade the specific provisions of the findings that the 
acts causing the collapse of the building were wilfully and 
knowingly done and hence wilful misconduct, the majority 
uses various devices. It ignores the express findings that 
the various things done or omitted and listed in paragraphs 
a to g are all qualified by the phrase preceding those para-
graphs that the failure was wilful and knowing. 
It discusses those paragraphs which appear to speak of 
negligence, failing, however, to stress the ones which do 
not point to negligence such as that the employer wilfully 
and knowingly failed to supply guy wires and braces for 
the structure. The findings pointing toward negligence should 
be disregarded under the authorities heretofore cited hold-
ing that such is the rule Vl>ith regard to commission findings 
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[40 C.2d 102; 251 P.2d 955] 
and the rule which demands liberal construction of the find-
ings. Even on appeal where findings of a court are reviewed, 
the rule is : ''An appellate court will construe findings lib-
erally in support of the judgment. Any uncertainties will 
be construed so as to uphold rather than defeat the judg-
ment, that is, to give it effect rather than destroy it. All 
the findings are to be read together, and must be reconciled 
to prevent any conflict on material points, if possible. Even 
if there is only one clear, sustained, and suffim:ent finding 
upon wh1:ch a judgrnent may rest, it will be presumed that 
the cmwt did rest the judgment on that finding. 
''In reviewing the sufficiency of findings to support a 
judgment, the appellate court will regard the ultimate facts 
found and not mere probative facts, unless the trial court's 
findings slww that the probative facts are the only £acts 
proved and that they alone are the basis for its finding of 
the ultimate facts. In the absence of such a showing, the 
mere circumstance that some of the probative facts are in-
consistent with the ultimate facts will not prevent the ulti-
mate £acts from controlling. And whenever the facts found 
are such as might authorize different inferences, it will be 
presumed that the inference made by the trial court was 
one that will uphold rather than defeat the judgment. In 
such a case the appellate court will not draw any inference 
contrary to that which might have been dravm by the trial 
court for the purpose of rendering its judgment." ( 4 Cal. 
Jur.2d Appeal and Error, § 571.) (Emphasis added.) 
The majority states that the theory of law adopted by the 
commission in its findings and award was erroneous. That, 
however, ignores the rule that : "It is, of course, immaterial 
that the theory upon which the judgment may be affirmed 
is not identical with that relied upon by plaintiffs or by 
the trial court, since plaintiffs are required only to plead 
and prove facts sufficient to justify relief, and the trial 
court's judgment must be affirmed if the findings, supported 
by the evidence, are sufficient to warrant the relief granted 
on any legal theory." (Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131, 140 
[163 P.2d 443]; 4 Cal.Jnr.2d, Appeal and Error, § 536.) 
There is ample here in the evidence and findings to sup-
port the theory that wilful misconduct is more than negli-
gence and is what the majority opinion describes it to be. 
Other things stated in the majority opinion, although dic-
tum, require comment. It is said that the increased award 
for wilful misconduct is a penalty and hence such an award 
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can be sustained only if the commission finds every fact 
essential to its imposition. In the first place the additional 
compensation is not a penalty. That was held in E. CLemens 
Horst Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 184 Cal. 180 [193 P. 
105, 16 .A.L.R. 611], where the court held the provision for 
increased compensation was not even exemplary damages 
and hence was constitutional. That holding is based upon 
the obvious truth that ordinary compensation does not fully 
cover the loss suffered by the employee. (E. Clemens Horst 
Co. v. Industr·ial Ace. Com., supra, 184 Cal. 180; Western 
lnde1nnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686 [151 P. 398]; West 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 79 Cal..App.2d 711 [180 P.2d 972].) 
Secondly, that statement is contrary to the above discussed 
rules that only ultimate facts need be found and findings 
must be liberally construed. In this same connection the 
statement that conduct any less culpable than wilful mis-
conduct would be an ''unlawful taking of the property of 
one person and unwarranted giving it to another'' is also 
incorrect for the same reasons. 
The majority opinion brushes aside such cases as Bethlehem 
Steel Co. v. Industria.l Ace. Com., 23 Cal.2d 659 [145 P.2d 
583] and Parklwrst v. Industrial Ace. Com., 20 Cal.2d 826 
[129 P.2d 113], holding wilful misconduct was present where 
a safety order was violated with the comment that in the 
ease at bar expert judgment was involved in guying the 
structure and no safety order was involved. Just as much 
expert judgment was involved and the safety order was sub-
stantially the same in those cases. Here we have the safety 
statutes and in the Bethlehem case the safety requirement 
was that loads transported by trucks be secured against dis-
placement. The safety statute here requires that the structure 
be safe, that is, secured against collapsing by sufficient guy 
wires or bracing. This the employer knew but wilfully dis-
regarded. Such disregard constituted serious and wilful 
misconduct. 
I would therefore affirm the awards here made. 
l(espondents' petition for a rehearing was denied February 
2, 1953. Carter, .T., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. Shenk, .T., did not participate therein. 
